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Abstract 
This paper asks whether the policies and programmes enacted to reduce greenhouse 
gas emissions in the UK will compete with other goals of public policy, in particular 
social policy goals. The Climate Change Act 2008 has set the UK some of the most 
demanding targets in the world: to reduce GHG emissions (compared with 1990) by at 
least 80% by 2050 and by at least 34% by 2020 – just nine years away. A wide array 
of climate change mitigation policies (CCMPs) have been put in place to bring this 
about. Will these compete fiscally with the large public expenditures on the welfare 
state? We address this question by surveying and costing all UK government policies 
that have a climate change mitigation objective and which are expressed through 
taxation, government expenditures and government-mandated expenditures by energy 
suppliers and other businesses and which are directed toward the household sector. 
Our conclusion is that expenditures on CCMPs are tiny – around one quarter of one 
per cent of GDP - and will not rise significantly. Within this the share of direct 
spending by government will fall and that obligated on utility companies will rise. 
Green taxes are also planned to fall as a share of GDP. There is no evidence here of 
fiscal competition between the welfare state and the environmental state. However, 
the use of mandated electricity and gas markets will impose rising costs on the 
household sector, which will bear more heavily on lower income households and will 
increase „fuel poverty‟. Thus demands on traditional social policies are likely to rise. 
More radical policy reforms will be needed to integrate climate change and social 
policy goals. 
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1. Introduction 
The UK government is said to have adopted the world‟s most demanding and legally 
binding targets to reduce CO2 and other greenhouse gases. The UK Climate Change 
Act 2008 requires the UK to reduce GHG emissions by at least 80% by 2050 and by at 
least 34% by 2020, compared with the base year of 1990. Furthermore it has set three 
intermediate Carbon Budgets, as shown in Chart 1. As well as statutory targets the Act 
established the Climate Change Committee (CCC) as an independent body to advise 
the government on setting and meeting carbon budgets. At the same time the new 
Department of Energy and Climate Change, headed then by Ed Miliband, published 
the UK Low Carbon Transition Plan which set out detailed targets and programmes to 
achieve these goals. This, and the subsequent very detailed reports of the CCC, 
analyse plans and achievements in reducing emissions under five main headings: 
power and heavy industry (which accounts for about one half of all emissions), 
transport, homes and communities, workplaces and jobs, and farming, land and waste.  
 
Chart 1: The UK’s carbon budgets are equivalemt to a 34% cut in greenhouse gas 
emissions in 2020 
 
Source: DECC (2009a), p.35, Chart 2. 
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The goal of this paper is to ask whether the policies and programmes enacted to 
achieve these ambitious goals competes, or will compete in the future, with other 
goals of public policy, in particular social policy goals.  
 
Over the course of the twentieth century the welfare state emerged as one of the most 
conspicuous features of developed societies. Social policy is characterised by 
provision of central social services, including education and health services, and by 
extensive income transfers via social protection programmes and tax credits. Total 
spending on these programmes in the OECD countries amounts to around 28% of 
GDP. In the UK total social spending in 2007 was 25.3% of GDP, but by 2009-10 it 
accounted for 29.7%, mainly due to the drop in the GDP denominator during the post-
financial crisis recession. The Coalition government plans a rapid reduction in real 
social spending and a slow decline in its share of GDP during the coming Parliament.  
 
Climate change will pose challenges to all institutions of modern developed societies, 
not least the welfare state. We ask here whether the necessary climate change 
mitigation policies (CCMPs) induce severe fiscal competition with the social 
programmes of the welfare state as some have suggested (Gough and Meadowcroft 
2011). At first sight this appears improbable since total environmental expenditure, 
according to government data amounts to only 0.8% of GDP in 2009-10 (PESA 
2010). Yet, the Coalition government‟s Comprehensive Spending Review of October 
2010 plans a 41% real growth in the capital budget of the Department for Energy and 
Climate Change (DECC) plus one billion pound funding for a Green Investment 
Bank, alongside unprecedented restraint on the welfare budget, which may presage a 
change of direction. Others ask, on the contrary, whether new carbon taxes could 
actually provide extra funds for social programmes (Büchs et al 2009). We also 
investigate conflicts and compatibilities between the growing raft of carbon mitigation 
programmes and allied social policies, such as the Fuel Poverty programmes. Will 
carbon mitigation and the „eco-state‟ gradually replace the welfare state as the 
dominant mission of governments in the 21st century? These are big questions, but we 
restrict ourselves here to the more modest one of fiscal costs and fiscal competition. 
 
Discussion of the costs of climate change mitigation raises big conceptual issues. 
Basically, three sets of costs can be distinguished: 
 Macroeconomic costs, such as impact on GDP growth, as for example 
modelled in the Stern Report (2007) 
 Costs to specific industries and to industrial competitiveness  
 Costs bearing on households, and the distribution of these between income 
groups and other household characteristics. 
 
We discuss only the third here. Our focus is mainly on policies to cut household 
emissions, as this is the area of greatest overlap with social policies. We address this 
question by summarising all UK government‟s policies that have a climate change 
mitigation objective and which are expressed through taxation, government 
expenditures and government-mandated expenditures by energy suppliers and other 
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businesses (for an earlier study of policy developments in 2006-07, see Snell 2008). 
We assess the costs of these programmes to government, with some estimates where 
necessary of the onward costs borne by business and households. We also consider 
briefly the distributive consequences of these programmes and some tentative 
estimates of the benefits in carbon saved. The period covered is 2005-06 to the present 
with forecasts to 2014-15, taking into account the new plans in the October 2010 
Spending Review. 
 
We should make clear what policies this report does not cover. First, it excludes the 
EU‟s Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) in which the UK participates. The ETS is an 
„upstream‟ cap-and-trade system applied to large industrial concerns including power 
generation across Europe. It sets an overall cap and requires companies to submit 
allowances to cover their verified emissions. Companies can trade their allowances 
and also use credits from economies achieved in developing countries. We are now 
approaching phase 3 of the ETS which will run from 2013-20. The ETS is the largest 
carbon trading system in the world and represents an historic institutional achievement 
but it has encountered numerous problems in the first two phases (NAO 2009). One 
result is that „no medium or long-term forward price for allowances has been 
established‟ (NAO 2009: 11). The best guess of the impact of the first two phases up 
to 2012 on UK emissions is zero (DECC 2009a: p.56, Chart 3; NAO 2009). It is for 
this reason that we exclude it here, though Phase 3 will embody many modifications 
and by 2020 the majority of permits are expected to be auctioned, raising an additional 
£8bn in revenues.  
 
Second, we exclude a wide range of non-traded policies aimed at industry, including 
investment in renewable energy, nuclear, and carbon capture and storage in coal-fired 
power stations, policies to reduce carbon emissions in transport and in industries 
outside the ETS and policies to reduce non-CO2 greenhouse gas emissions in 
agriculture. We focus mainly on programmes to cut household energy emissions.  
 
Third, we do not investigate the impact of direct government regulations on domestic 
and commercial products, building efficiency and the EU vehicle efficiency 
regulations. These may impose substantial costs although these costs will be mitigated 
through lower energy use. Nor do we consider education and information programmes 
intended to directly influence behaviour and lifestyle.  
 
The data presented in this report is subject to other important caveats: 
i. We have taken an inclusive approach to what ought to be included. Where 
DECC have claimed an environmental objective for a programme in the 
Low Carbon Transition Plan, or a programme is featured in the Committee 
for Climate Change‟s reports, the programmes have been included. This 
means that some programmes may have been included when their 
contribution to abatement efforts are small. 
ii. Most local projects that aim to reduce carbon emissions will have been 
missed in our audit; this includes, for example, most initiatives to encourage 
more cycling. 
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iii. Spending figures are provided for the total cost of programmes. No effort 
has been made to impute the portion that goes towards climate change 
mitigation. To the extent that programmes have other goals, spending on 
climate change mitigation is lower than reported. This also means that one 
cannot directly judge the relative importance of programmes in government 
efforts to combat climate change from the relative spending.  
iv. Future programmes for which an ambition has been announced but the 
specifics have not been worked up are not generally included. 
v. Scope has been limited to domestic programmes only. Programmes and 
expenditures that directly help other countries reduce their greenhouse gas 
emissions, such as British contributions of around £1.5bn between 2010 and 
2011 to the “Fast Start Finance” programme, are excluded1. 
vi. All figures are in nominal terms. 
vii. Generally, figures in italics are assumed, interpolated or forecasted 
extremely crudely while other figures have an official source. 
 
The report is structured as follows. Section 2 describes „green‟ taxes with an identified 
climate change mitigation goal. Section 3 summarises and costs CCM programmes 
that involve direct expenditures by the government. Section 4 outlines government 
programmes that mandate spending by the private sector; it also provides estimates of 
the cost of these programmes to consumers. Section 5 briefly considers some 
distributional consequences including impacts on „fuel poverty‟, and compares 
CCMPs with compensatory social transfers such as the Winter Fuel Allowance. 
Section 6 presents initial calculations of the carbon savings to be achieved by these 
programmes. The conclusion summarises our findings and presents brief 
recommendations.  
 
2.  Environmental Taxation  
We begin with environmental taxation, since this has by far the largest fiscal impact. 
Table 1 below shows the revenues from the major taxes that could be considered to 
have at least a partial objective of climate change mitigation.  
 
                                                 
1
   http://www.dfid.gov.uk/Media-Room/News-Stories/2010/UK-confirms-action-on-climate-and-forests/ 
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Table 1: ‘Green’ taxation revenues 
 
£m   
2005-
06 
2006-
07 
2007-
08 
2008-
09 
2009-
10 
2010-
11 
2011-
12 
2012-
13 
2013-
14 
2014-
15 
            
2.1 Fuel duties 23,440 23,590 24,910 24,620 26,200 27,300 28,900 30,300 31,800 33,400 
2.2 Air Passenger Duty 910 970 1,990 1,860 1,860 2,300 2,900 3,000 3,300 3,500 
2.3 Landfill Tax 730 800 880 950 840 1,100 1,170 1,220 1,250 1,310 
2.4 Climate Change Levy 740 710 690 720 700 700 740 780 800 830 
2.5 Vehicle Excise Duty 5,000 5,100 5,400 5,600 5,600 5,900 6,000 6,100 6,200 6,300 
2.6 London Congestion Charge (Gross) 260 250 330 330 330 330 330 330 330 330 
2.7 Company Car Tax 1,920 1,860 1,830 2,300 2,300 2,300 2,300 2,300 2,300 2,300 
2.8 Carbon Reduction Commitment 0 0 0 0 0 0 715 730 995 1,020 
 Total Environmental Taxes 33,000 33,280 36,030 36,380 37,830 39,930 43,055 44,760 46,975 48,990 
 - as A percentage of GDP 2.59% 2.47% 2.53% 2.54% 2.70% 2.71% 2.80% 2.76% 2.75% 2.73% 
 
Sources: 
2.1, 2.2: 2005-10 HMRC Receipts (June 2010), 2010-2015 HMT Budget (June 2010) 
2.3, 2.4: 2005-10 HMRC Receipts (June 2010), 2010-11 HMT Budget (April 2010), 2011-15 grown in line with 'Other HMRC Receipts' HMT Budget Forecast (June 2010) 
as forecasts no longer provided separately. Given the landfill tax escalator, this almost certainly underestimates the increase in its receipts. Budget 2009 indicates that CCL 
will raise around £700m per year in revenues in 2010-11, with receipts being roughly flat since 2005-06. Forecasts of CCL receipts are no longer provided separately so, as 
with Landfill Tax, receipts from 2011-12 onwards are assumed to have increased in line with „other HMRC Receipts‟. 
2.5: HMT Budget (2006-10) 
2.6: 2005-08 TFL Annual Reports, 2008-15 assumed constant.  
2.7: 2005-08 HMRC, 2008-09 HMT Carbon Budget, 2009-15 assumed constant. 
2.8: 2011-15 HMT Spending Review 2010 
% GDP Figures calculated using HMT June Budget forecast 2010 
All figures are rounded to the nearest £10m except for VED receipts which are rounded to the nearest £100m 
From June Budget 2010, forecasts of landfill tax revenues (as well as those for the Climate Change Levy and the Aggregates Levy), are no longer provided separately, but are 
rolled into „other HMRC receipts‟. 
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There has been no significant switch to green taxation, nor is one planned. Revenues 
from environmental taxes have risen from around £33bn in 2005-6 to £38bn in 2009-
10 and by the end of this parliament will be around £49bn, but as a share of GDP they 
will remain roughly constant at 2.7% of GDP. Throughout the period about two thirds 
of environmental tax revenues come from fuel duties, with vehicle excise duty making 
up the next largest share.  
 
2.1 Fuel Duties 
Fuel duties are levied on hydrocarbon oils and their substitutes. The bulk of receipts 
come from duty on petrol and diesel, set at £0.54p per litre in 2009-10. Duty is also 
levied on heating oil, fuel oil, and others. Reduced rates are charged on bio-ethanol 
and bio-diesel. 
 
2.2 Air Passenger Duty 
Air passenger duty is a per passenger tax on flights originating in the UK. The level of 
duty depends on the length of the flight and the class of seat, with premium economy, 
business and first class passengers paying double the economy rate. Rates are 
scheduled to increase in November 2010, and have increased rapidly since the 
introduction of APD in 1994. 
 
2.3 Landfill Tax 
The Landfill Tax is a tax on waste disposed at landfill sites, to reduce the amount of 
waste sent to landfill by encouraging alternative options such as incineration or 
recycling. The June Budget 2010, introduced a „landfill tax escalator‟ until at least 
2014. Revenues are planned to rise to an expected £1.1bn in 2010-11.  
 
2.4 Climate Change Levy 
The Climate Change Levy (CCL) is an indirect tax on notional units of energy 
supplied to non-domestic consumers. It was introduced in 2001, replacing the Fossil 
Fuels Levy. The current rates are 0.43 pence per kWh for electricity, 0.15 pence per 
kWh for gas and 0.96 pence per kWh for petroleum. The revenues shown here are net 
of the exemption for renewables i.e. they are receipts actually received. There is no 
Levy on energy supplied to domestic consumers. 
 
2.5 Vehicle Excise Duty 
Since June 1999, Vehicle Excise Duty (VED) has had an explicit dual revenue raising 
and environmental purpose, and since 2005-06, cars registered since 1 March 2001 
have been taxed directly according to the level of CO2 emissions per kilometre. VED 
raised approximately £5bn in 2005-06 rising to a forecast £6bn in 2011-12. 
 
2.6 London Congestion Charge 
The London Congestion Charge is a daily levy on vehicles entering the Congestion 
Charging Zone between 7am and 6pm Monday to Friday. The charge was introduced 
in 2003 at a standard rate of £5 per vehicle and was increased in 2005 to £8 per 
vehicle. Transport for London describes the congestion charge as a toll not a tax.  
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2.7 Company Car Tax and fuel benefit 
Company Car Tax is an addition to taxable income based on the imputed value of a 
company car and fuel provided as a benefit in kind. The list prices rise steeply 
according to carbon emissions per km.  
 
2.8 Carbon Reduction Commitment 
The Carbon Reduction Commitment is a mandatory scheme for large users of 
electricity not covered by Climate Change Agreements or the EU Emissions Trading 
Scheme. The details of the policy are currently under revision following Spending 
Review 2010. In its previous incarnation, after establishing an energy use baseline, 
energy users would be required to purchase enough permits for the year ahead at the 
start of each year (initially at a price of £12 per tonne, later auctioned). In the event of 
a firm facing a shortfall, additional permits must be obtained either from another 
energy user or from the government (thus imposing a price ceiling). Prior to Spending 
Review 2010, the revenues were to be recycled to energy users who were more 
successful in reducing or controlling their emissions. However, the Review 
announced that revenues from sales will now flow the exchequer, generating £0.7bn 
in 2011-12 rising to over £1bn by 2014-15. This why we place the CRC as a tax.  
 
3.  Government direct programmes to reduce household carbon 
emissions 
This section briefly outlines direct government expenditures with climate change 
mitigation as one of their stated objectives and which impact on households. Table 2 
gives nominal direct spending by programme rounded to at least the nearest £5m. For 
details on these, and data sources, see the programme-by-programme descriptions that 
follow.  
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Table 2: Direct Spending by programme 
 
£m   
2005-
06 
2006-
07 
2007-
08 
2008-
09 
2009-
10 
2010-
11 
2011-
12 
2012-
13 
2013-
14 
2014-
15 
3.1 Decent Homes 670 670 670 650 670 670 670 670 670 670 
3.2 Warm Front 150 300 350 360 300 300 200 100 0 0 
3.3 Devolved Energy Efficiency Programmes 95 95 100 100 100 115 115 115 115 115 
3.4a RHI (non domestic) 0 0 0 0 0 0 25 50 100 150 
3.4b 
RHI (Renewable Heat Premium 
Payments) 0 0 0 0 0 0 15    
3.4c RHI (domestic)        ? ? ? 
3.5 Ultra Low Carbon Vehicle Incentive 0 0 0 0 0 0 85 85 85 85 
3.6 Green Bus Fund 0 0 0 0 30 15 15 15 15 15 
 Total 915 1065 1120 1110 1100 1100 1125 1035 985 1035 
 
Sources: 
3.1: 2005-09, Carbon Trust Annual Reports, 2009-15 authors estimates (see text). http://www.communities.gov.uk/documents/statistics/pdf/1186234.pdf see also Business 
Plan Statistical Appendix. We assume spending on the thermal element of decent homes will be flat subsequently. Given the 70% reduction in DCLG‟s capital budget 
announced in spending review 2010 this is almost certainly optimistic.  
3.2: 2007-09 DCLG Local Authority Business Plan Statistical Appendix, 2009-11 Committee for Climate Change (2009)  Meeting Carbon Budgets: The need for a step 
change. p.73, 2013-15 HMT Spending Review 2010, 2011-15 assumed. According to UK Fuel Poverty Strategy Annual Reports, between 2005-06 and 2007-08, £800m was 
spent on Warm Front. Over the 2008-11 spending round, spending is expected to be £959m, with £359m spent in 2008-09. We assume that the remaining spending is split 
evenly (£300m each year) between 2009-10 and 2010-11. We assume spending from 2012-14 onwards will be nil and spending in 2011-12 and 2012-13 have been 
interpolated on a straight line basis. 
3.3: 2008-11 http://www.greenerlivingfund.org.uk/about/ and http://www.infoscotland.com/gogreener/912.html, 2011-15 assumed. HEES Annual Reports 2006-07 to 2008-
09.  In 2004/05 and 2005/06 the devolved administration paid the levy on behalf of customers. 
Review of Energy Efficiency Levy Program (2006) http://www.uregni.gov.uk/uploads/publications/The_Energy_Efficiency_Levy_Programme_-Review.doc 
3.4. DECC (2011) “Renewable Heat Incentive” & DECC (2011) “Renewable Heat Incentive: Impact Assessment”, 3.4a figures suggestive. 
3.5: Assumption based on BERR (2009) “Ultra-Low Carbon Vehicles in the UK” 
3.6: Various, see text. The Green Bus Fund scheme initially received £30m of first round funding in 2009. In July of this year £15m of second round funding was announced 
for 2010. WE assume that the government continues to provide funding worth £15m per year going forward 
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3.22: 2009-11 http://www.dft.gov.uk/pgr/regional/buses/greenbusfund/, 2011-15 assumed. The incentive was expected to provide £250m from 2011. It is not made clear in 
the policy document, or Budget 2009, over how many years the spending is expected to be spread over; we assume over what would have been the three year spending round 
at the time of publication. We assume the spending continues at the same level subsequently. 
 
Often, expenditure figures are only available over the three year spending review periods, 2005-06 to 2007-08 and 2008-09 to 2010-11. When this is the case, we assume that 
expenditure in each of the three years is one third of the total (unless other information is available). Given that spending tends to grow, this will tend to overstate spending at 
the start of the spending periods. 
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Direct spending on programmes targeting households increased from £0.9bn in 2005-
06 to £1.1bn in 2010-11. Spending is expected to be roughly flat in the short term as 
Warm Front is phased out and replaced with the „Green Deal‟ (primarily financed by 
energy providers) and Renewable Heat Incentive payments begin. The remainder of 
this section describes each of the programmes listed in the table.  
 
3.1 Decent Homes (Thermal Element) 
Decent Homes is a set of standards for social housing, including having a reasonable 
degree of thermal comfort, which requires that the dwelling must meet certain 
standards of insulation. The Committee on Climate Change estimates that over the 
period 2008-11 around £670m will be spent each year on meeting the targets 
embodied by the thermal element of Decent Homes. A breakdown by type
2
 shows that 
this is mostly due to spending of £391m on central heating, £27m on insulation and 
£229m on windows (totalling £647m).  In 2008-09, total capital spending on 
installation, replacement and major repairs for social housing in England was planned 
to be £2.8bn, suggesting approximately one quarter of capital spending is to increase 
energy efficiency. Note future spending figures assume, perhaps unrealistically given 
the cuts in DCLG‟s capital budget announced in Spending review 2010, that spending 
on the thermal element of Decent Homes remains constant. As this constitutes two 
thirds of direct spending by 2015-16 any reduction in this spending will also 
substantially reduce total spending. 
 
3.2 Warm Front 
Warm Front provides grants of up to £4000 for upgrades to eligible households‟ 
insulation and heating systems, including new boilers, loft and cavity wall insulation 
(£6000 if installing oil or renewable energy based systems). Eligible households are 
defined as those receiving benefits or tax credits. Spending Review 2010 announced 
the winding down of the Warm Front scheme and phase-out from 2013-14.  
 
3.3 Devolved Administrations Energy Efficiency Programmes 
Wales has the Home Energy Efficiency Scheme which is similar to Warm Front. 
Scotland has the Energy Assistance Package (EEP) and the Home Insulation Scheme 
(HIS), both of which target energy saving upgrades for mainly low income houses. 
The „Northern Ireland Sustainable Energy Programme‟ is different. Funded by a per 
customer levy on electricity suppliers, it provides funding for energy efficiency 
upgrades, mainly targeted at low income households. For years since 2006-7 we 
assume no direct government expenditure but there is obviously an indirect cost to 
energy users. It also has the „Warm Homes‟ scheme which is broadly equivalent to 
Warm Front.  
 
3.4 Renewable Heat Incentive 
The Renewable Heat Incentive (RHI) is intended to encourage businesses and 
households to generate heat using a range of renewables including biomass, solar 
thermal and ground and water source heat pumps. Following the review of RHI 
announced at Comprehensive Spending Review 2010, RHI is now being introduced in 
two phases. The first phases is targeted at the non-domestic sector and will be funded 
from general taxation. The subsidy is expected to cost £5.4bn in the years to 2020 and 
                                                 
2
  Local Authority Housing Statistics (2009) – Table 7 
 http://www.communities.gov.uk/documents/statistics/pdf/1186234.pdf 
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cost £1.4bn per annum in 2020, given this information the figures in the table are a 
plausible guess at the profile of the spending. Non-domestic RHI provides a payment 
per kwH of heat produced depending on the size of the installation.  The domestic 
RHI is intended to begin alongside „Green Deal‟ in 2012, however details of the 
policy and its expected costs have not yet been release and given past changes in the 
policy it is not even certain who will end up paying the bill. Currently 1% of the UK‟s 
heat is from renewable sources and the Renewable Heat Incentive is intended to 
support an increase to 11%.  
 
3.5 Ultra-low carbon vehicles incentive 
The ultra-low carbon vehicle incentive was announced in January 2009 and is 
scheduled to start at the beginning of the next spending round (from 2011-12). The 
incentive comes in two parts. The bulk of the money is reserved for subsidising 25% 
of the purchase price (up to £5000) of new electric or plug-in hybrid personal 
vehicles. There is also £20m to support the roll-out of charging stations. 
 
3.6 Other transport measures 
The Green Bus Fund is a Department of Transport initiative, providing grants to local 
authorities to cover part of the cost of investment in low carbon buses that emit 
around 1/3 less carbon than a standard bus.  
 
3.7 Departmental Carbon Budgets 
Money spent to hit departmental carbon budgets (in excess of the support provided by 
the Carbon Trust etc.) has not been included (DECC 2009a: 215). Departments are 
obligated to reduce their emissions from buildings by 30%, from a 1999-2000 
baseline, and from transport by 30%, from a 2005-06 baseline.  
 
4.  Mandated Spending 
This section summarises, and attempts to attach costs to, government programmes that 
mandate spending by the private sector, mainly energy companies, and have a 
significant climate change mitigation objective. „Costs‟ here refer to the extra costs 
imposed on energy suppliers as a result of CCMPs; however, it is expected that these 
will largely be passed on to end users. Section 4.1 outlines the expected mandated 
costs of programmes already announced, and mentions, but does not attempt to cost, 
some programmes that are expected in the future. Section 4.2 summarises DECC‟s 
most recent estimates of the impact of these programmes on consumers and businesses 
utility bills. 
 
4.1  Costs of mandated programmes. 
Table 3 shows mandated spending by programme for the years 2005-6 to 2015-16. 
Sources and the methodology behind the figures are included in the brief programme 
summaries that follow. All the figures in this section should be taken merely as 
indicative, while those in italics are guesstimates. Mandated spending has nearly 
trebled in five years from around £0.9bn in 2005-06 to £2.5bn in 2010-11 and is 
expected to continue to increase to £3.7bn by 2015-16. Thus it will increase in real 
terms and as a proportion of GDP. 
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Table 3: Estimated costs of mandated spending programmes 
 
£m  2005-
06 
2006-
07 
2007-
08 
2008-
09 
2009-
10 
2010-
11 
2011-
12 
2012-
13 
2013-
14 
2014-
15 
4.1 Carbon Emissions 
Reduction Target 
300 300 300 1,070 1,070 1,070 1,400 700 0 0 
4.2 Community Energy 
Saving Program 
0 0 0 0 100 100 100 50 0 0 
4.3 Green Deal 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 750 1,500 1,500 
4.4 Feed in Tariffs 0 0 0 0 0 50 100 150 200 300 
4.5 Smart Meters 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 50 100 
4.6 Renewable Obligation 590 710 870 1,030 1,100 1,310 1,350 1,500 1,650 1,830 
 Total Mandated 
Spending 
890 1010 1170 2100 2270 2530 2950 3150 3400 3730 
 
Source: 
4.1: Based on DECC Impact Assessments.  Source: Eoin Lees Energy evaluation of EEC2 for DEFRA. Presentation here: 
http://www.ofgem.gov.uk/Sustainability/Environment/Policy/EnvAdvGrp/Documents1/Eoin%20Lees%20EEC2%20evaluation%20presentation.pdf 
4.2: Based on DECC Impact Asessments 
4.3: Assumed 
4.4: Assumption Based on DECC Feed in Tariff Impact Asessment.  FiT Impact Assesment - 
http://www.decc.gov.uk/en/content/cms/consultations/elec_financial/elec_financial.aspx 
The figures in the table are highly speculative, based on our crude assumption that the amount of energy generated initially is likely to be low and increasing over time, as 
well as reflecting an estimated cost of £0.6bn p/a in 2020 in the original impact assessments and an estimated cost of £360m p/a in 2015 in the 2011 Review. 
4.5: Assumed.  Source: DECC (2009) “Impact assessment of a GB-wide smart meter roll out for the domestic sector”.   
4.6. The information supplied in the RO annual report allows us to infer the additional cost to the consumer in a straightforward manner for each year to 2008-09. This is 
done by applying the cost of buyouts to the certificates that suppliers did obtain. The underlying principle here is that the price of renewables is set by the marginal producer. 
For years after 2008-09, we have assumed that the total amount of electricity supplied remains constant , so the number of certificates required increases in proportion with 
the obligation. We then calculate the cost by multiplying this figure by the buyout price for this year. The price of obligations has not been set for 2011-12 so we increase the 
price in line with forecast RPI in June Budget 2010 Table C5 (4.2% for 2010-11). The same exercise is completed for Scotland and Northern Ireland; the figures above are 
the sum of all three schemes. 
 
13 
 
4.1 Carbon Emissions Reduction Target (CERT) 
The Carbon Emissions Reduction Target (CERT), is an obligation made on energy 
suppliers and producers to improve domestic energy efficiency in the UK. The way 
these efficiency savings are delivered is left to providers, with government allocating 
an amount of CO2 to a menu of energy efficient upgrades such as cavity wall 
insulation or loft insulation. Providers are allowed to split the cost of upgrades with 
those receiving them, but 40% of the CO2 savings must accrue to elderly households 
or to those on benefits. Industry as a whole is obligated to save 293MtCO2 through 
2008-12, an increase from the original target of 154MtCO2. The cost of this to energy 
providers is an estimated £1.1bn per year 2008-11 and £1.4bn per year over the 
extension period of April 2011-December2012. From 2005-08 (under the Energy 
Efficiency Commitment 2) suppliers had to produce energy savings of 130 TWh‟s at 
an estimated cost of £300m per year.  
 
4.2 Community Energy Savings Programme (CESP) 
The Community Energy Savings Programme (CESP) began in 2009-10 and is another 
obligation made on energy suppliers and producers to improve domestic energy 
efficiency in the UK. CESP requires that energy suppliers and generators provide 
upgrades to the heating systems and insulation in low income neighbourhoods, 
targeting only households in the bottom income decile. CESP is being used to pilot a 
„whole house‟ approach to energy efficiency in England and Wales, where all cost-
effective upgrades are applied en-masse to selected dwellings. The programme 
imposes costs on suppliers expected to be around £100m per annum. We assume that 
CESP continues to be funded at this level until it‟s phased out in favour of Green 
Deal, see below. 
 
4.3 Green Deal 
After December 2012 CERT is to be replaced by the „Green Deal‟. This will allow 
households to obtain energy efficiency upgrades at no upfront cost with payment 
coming though part of the saving in energy bills. Energy companies will be required, 
under the new Energy Company Obligation (ECO), to help poorer customers and 
those in hard to treat homes, and to provide basic heating and insulation to the poorest 
and most vulnerable households. ECO will replace CERT and CESP. In the absence 
of additional evidence we assume the mandated cost of Green Deal will be the same 
as the extension of CERT and CESP combined. 
 
4.4 Feed in Tariffs 
Feed in tariffs are intended to encourage micro-generation of renewable energy by 
guaranteeing an above market price for the first 20 years (25 for photovoltaic) of 
energy produced. The higher prices are set by government at a level sufficient to 
make micro generation economically attractive. UK Feed in Tariffs came into force 
on April 1 2010. As well as paying an above market rate for electricity provided to the 
grid, micro-generators also receive a payment for the electricity they generate and use. 
The payments are made by the electricity providers, who presumably pass on the cost 
to their customers, so the direct cost to government of feed in tariffs is negligible but 
consumers as a whole pay via higher energy prices. The expected resource cost is 
£0.6bn per year by 2020 and £8.6bn cumulative to 2030. A review of Feed in Tariffs 
was announced in Spending Review 2010, in which payments to large photovoltaic 
installations were reduced following falls in the cost of photovoltaic equipment and 
higher than  expected take-up. 
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4.5 Smart Meters  
By 2020 government wants every household to be equipped with smart meters. The 
roll-out will begin once the regulatory framework surrounding smart metering has 
been established around autumn 2013. The cost of the roll-out is expected to be 
around £800m and will be paid by energy suppliers and passed on to consumers via 
higher energy bills. We have assumed a cost of £100m per annum from Autumn 2013.  
Relative to a „no climate change mitigation policy‟ baseline, energy prices are 
expected to be 1-2% higher in 2020 due to smart metering. 
 
4.6 Renewables Obligation 
The Renewables Obligation (RO) mandates that electricity suppliers obtain 
Renewables Obligation Certificates (RoCs) of a quantity proportional to the amount 
of electricity supplied RoCs are issued to certified renewable power generators who 
can sell them on to suppliers. If suppliers cannot obtain sufficient RoCs they have the 
option of paying the buy-out price for the shortfall. The buy-out price in 2008-09 was 
set at £35.76 per mWh and the price increases each year in line with the previous 
years RPI. The proceeds of any buyouts are distributed to holders of RoCs according 
to their share of the total number of renewables certificates. Therefore, the value of a 
RoC is the buyout-out price, plus the share of buyout revenues; in 2008-09 this was a 
total of £54.37. This is the implicit subsidy per mWh for renewable energy. As well as 
the cost of renewables buyouts increasing, the number of renewable certificates 
required as a portion of energy supplied also increases – from 3% of supply in 2002-
03 to 15.4% of supply in 2015.  
 
4.2  Who pays? DECC forecast impact of programmes on utility bills. 
DECC (2010b) estimates the impact of these mandated policies on energy prices and 
consumer and medium size commercial energy bills in 2010, 2015 and 2020. This is 
compared to a counterfactual of no climate change policies. Note that, in addition to 
the policies mentioned in the preceding section, the costs here include the impact of 
the EU ETS, an as yet undefined replacement (or continuation) for CERT beyond 
2012 known as the „Future Supplier Obligation‟ and some EU efficiency and labelling 
standards. Table 5 shows DECC‟s estimated impacts of climate change mitigation 
policies on energy prices and bills for the „central‟ fossil fuel price scenario in which 
the price of oil is assumed to be $80 per barrel by 2020 (at 2009 prices). DECC 
assume that transmission, metering and distribution costs rise in line with historical 
trends. This scenario implies a real increase in electricity wholesale prices of 14% 
over the next decade and in gas prices of 15%.  
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Table 5: Forecast increase in energy prices and energy bills 
 
„central‟ fossil fuel prices 
  2010 2015 2020 
    
Domestic Users    
Increase in Gas Prices 4% 9% 12% 
Increase in Electricity Prices 15% 29% 40% 
Total Increase in Energy Bills 4% -1%% -6%% 
    
Commercial Users    
Increase in Gas Prices 6% 9% 18% 
Increase in Electricity Prices 20% 28% 43% 
Total Increase in Energy Bills 14% 9% 20% 
 
Source: DECC (2010b) p. 6 & p. 10 with cost of RHI netted off. 
 
For domestic users policies are estimated to have increased gas prices by 4% today, 
rising to 12% by 2020. Electricity prices are thought to be 15% higher than otherwise 
today and are expected to be 40% higher by 2020. The average impact on actual 
energy bills will depend on the uptake of energy efficiency measures and renewables 
incentives. The DECC estimates assume great success in this respect, with average 
domestic bills expected to be only 4% higher than otherwise today and just 1% higher 
in 2020. These assumptions may be over-optimistic, not to say complacent. Note also 
that the costs and benefits of the policies will not be distributed evenly, as those who 
are able to benefit from the measures will see their bills fall while those who do not 
will see their bills rise. 
 
5. Distributional impacts: Fuel poverty, social compensation and 
climate mitigation spending 
One major goal of social policy, by no means the only one, is to compensate for 
market-generated inequalities that are considered inequitable or unjust. Thus we ask 
what are the distributional impacts of the programmes surveyed above, though we 
restrict ourselves solely to income differences between households (see Gough et al 
2011 for a more detailed analysis of the distributional aspects of carbon emissions and 
CCMPs). 
 
Green taxation: The major item here is fuel duty and, according to a study in 2002-03, 
a rise in petrol duty impacts more strongly on the upper half of the income distribution 
(Leicester 2005). Thus fuel duty is slightly progressive in its incidence; however, 
since there has been little change in the share of this and other green taxes in GDP, the 
distributional change is neutral. In any case there are principled objections to 
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estimating the distributional effect of any single tax measure. The overall impact of all 
taxes is roughly proportionate.  
 
Direct expenditure on CCMPs: The majority of these are targeted on households 
receiving benefits and tax credits and are thus likely to be progressive in their impact. 
According to the CCC (2008: 418), the Supplier Obligations could be seen thus far as 
subsidising energy efficiency improvements for fuel poor households. However, as we 
have seen, they attract tiny levels of expenditure (less than 0.01% of GDP) and are set 
to decline. 
 
Mandated expenditure on CCMPs: These programmes are more significant and are 
planned to grow. We have also noted that they will drive up household energy costs, 
and are intended to. The DECC estimates discussed above predict that energy bills 
will rise by over 5% up to 2020 (a very low estimate according to some), the major 
part of which will be from the ETS and domestic supplier obligations. These burdens 
will fall more heavily on lower income households – see Chart 2. Thus the overall 
impact of the current pattern of carbon mitigation programmes in the UK will be 
regressive. 
 
Chart 2: Increase in energy bills in 2020 for different income deciles 
 
 
Source: DECC 2010b, p.15, Chart 7 
 
Fuel poverty 
„Fuel poverty‟ is defined in the UK as a situation where a household needs to spend 
more than 10% of its income on total fuel in order to heat its home to an adequate 
standard – 21°C in the main living room and 18°C in other occupied rooms during 
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daytime hours, with lower temperatures at night. This figure is a form of „capability‟ 
measure, which models the number of households who would be spending more than 
10% of their income if they chose to maintain these temperatures. Fuel Poverty is 
driven by four main factors: 
 Low income 
 High fuel prices, including the use of relatively expensive fuel sources  
 Poor energy efficiency of a home 
 Under-occupancy of dwellings 
 
Recent figures from DECC‟s Annual Report on Fuel Poverty Statistics 2010 (2010a) 
shows the proportion of UK households modelled as being in fuel poverty more than 
doubled in four years, from 2.0m in 2004 to 4.5m in 2008 - or 18% of all households. 
The main driver was a sharp rise in fuel bills of 18%pa, offset slightly by rising 
incomes (in the bottom three deciles where over 95% of the fuel poor are located) of 
4%pa and improvements in energy efficiency of 2%pa. However, the latter is an 
average which lumps together a small minority who have gained and a majority who 
have not. The rise was also driven by a sharp rise of 45% in the number of „under-
occupied‟ households. A comparison of actual fuel spending with these models 
suggests that average temperatures have been allowed to fall in response to these 
higher energy bills.  
 
The CCC estimates that the electricity and gas price impacts of the UK carbon budgets 
could increase the number of fuel poor households by 1.7m by 2022 (CCC 2008: 
395). The costs of taking the extra fuel poor households back out of fuel poverty and 
mitigating the impact of higher electricity and gas prices on those already in poverty 
would be of the order of £500m annually. This illustrates the likely future regressive 
impact of „mandated market policies‟ which are intended to be financed from higher 
consumer bills. 
 
Social compensation versus carbon mitigation 
Several of the programmes in sections 3 and 4 have social as well as climate change 
mitigation objectives, partly directed to those suffering „fuel poverty‟. On the direct 
expenditure side we have Decent Homes, Warm Front and the Devolved 
Administrations‟ Energy Efficiency Programmes. Indirectly, the Carbon Emissions 
Reduction Target mandates some improvements in energy efficiency for low income 
households, while the Community Energy Savings programme (and the future Green 
Deal) is targeted directly at low income households. These programmes constitute 
direct spending of around £1.1bn and mandated spending of approximately £1.2bn in 
2009-10, although not all the mandated spending will flow to low income households.  
 
However, these sums are outweighed by compensation payments (Table 5). In the 
past, the government‟s main direct weapons against fuel poverty have been 
compensatory: Winter Fuel Payments, a flat rate payment of £250 to households with 
pensioners (£400 if the oldest resident is at least 80) and Cold Weather Payments, 
which provide additional payments of £25 to pensioners and low income households 
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for each seven day period where temperatures average below 0˚C. The cost of these 
was around £2.7bn in 2009-10
3
. To these should now be added the new Warm Home 
Discount: a mandatory scheme which will automatically award pensioners on Pension 
Credit annual rebates of at least £120 off their electricity bills, with some support 
available for other groups too. The Warm Home Discount replaces the previous 
voluntary agreement with energy suppliers which ended in March 2011. Over the four 
years of the scheme to 2015, the Warm Home Discount will be worth up to £1.1 
billion and is projected to help around 2 million households per year. The scheme is 
projected to help around two million households per year, with the majority of the 
rebates delivered by energy suppliers in the winter months. 
 
Thus spending on compensatory fuel poverty programmes has exceeded energy-
saving programmes. Professor John Hills has now (early 2011) been appointed by 
Energy and Climate Change Secretary Chris Huhne to lead an independent Review of 
the fuel poverty concept, definition and target. 
 
                                                 
3
   http://www.dwp.gov.uk/previous-administration-news/press-releases/2010/march-2010/dwp044-10-
120310.shtml 
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Table 5: Spending on energy efficiency programmes versus compensatory transfers 
 
£m 
2005-
06 
2006-
07 
2007-
08 
2008-
09 
2009-
10 
2010-
11 
2011-
12 
2012-
13 
2013-
14 
2014-
15 
Warm Front 150 300 350 360 300 300 200 100 0 0 
Devolved Energy Efficiency Programs 95 95 100 100 100 115 115 115 115 115 
Decent Homes 670 670 670 650 670 670 670 670 670 670 
Carbon Emmisions Reduction Target 300 300 300 1070 1070 1070 1400 700 0 0 
Community Energy Saving Program 0 0 0 0 100 100 100 50 0 0 
Green Deal (very speculative)       0 750 1500 1500 
Social Spending + Environment (Fuel 
Poverty) 1215 1365 1420 2180 2240 2255 2485 2385 2285 2285 
Winter Fuel Payments 1982 2015 2071 2701 2735 2734 2094 2031 1963 1897 
 
Source:  
Winter Fuel Payments Source: DWP Expenditure Tables, Table 2 
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6.  Carbon Abatement by Programme 
How effective are these programmes in mitigating carbon emissions? It is not easy to 
monitor past or forecast carbon savings. Table 6 below summarises the information 
from DECC‟s Low Carbon Transition Plan on how much carbon may be saved by 
some of the programmes mentioned in this report. The final column then divides this 
by our estimates of programme costs to estimate the CO2 savings per pound spent. 
Information was not available for all programmes so our coverage is incomplete. The 
methodology employed to derive forecasts of CO2 savings appears to vary from 
programme to programme, and in any case, estimates of future carbon savings must be 
highly speculative.  
 
The programmes we survey are predicted to save two-thirds of a billion tonnes of CO2 
over the period the three Carbon Budget periods from 2008-22. The major 
contributors are industrial level obligations - the Renewables Obligations and Supplier 
Obligations which account for about one half billion tonnes. Of the remainder, the 
most important are CERT, Decent Homes and Warm Front and their successors which 
between them should save about 100 MtCO2. 
 
Further difficulties are encountered in estimating CO2 saved per pound spent. The 
costs for CERT are the (forecast) costs incurred due to interventions from 2008-11, 
divided by forecast CO2 savings attributable to these costs between 2008-22. This is 
straightforward; however, some of the interventions allowable under CERT, such as 
insulation, may continue to accrue carbon savings after this period, and some, such as 
energy efficiency light bulbs, may not. Conversely, the estimate of cost per tonne 
saved for enhanced capital allowances are (forecast) carbon savings over the lifetime 
of the intervention. 
 
With these provisos in mind, the implicit CO2 cost in all the programmes exceeds the 
current ETS carbon price of €15 (c£13) per tonne, or the estimated „level playing field 
price‟ of €40 per tonne (Larsson and Lonnroth, 2010). We also find great variation in 
the carbon reduction „efficiency‟ of different programmes. For example Feed-In 
Tariffs to subsidise home production of electricity appear to cost almost ten times as 
much per tonne of carbon saved as does the Renewable Heat Incentive to encourage 
renewable home heating. The Community Energy Saving Programme which will 
provide whole house retrofitting for low income households in poorer areas appears to 
cost over four times as much per tonne saved than does the less ambitious CERT 
programme to improve domestic energy efficiency partly targeted at households 
receiving pensions or benefits.  
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Table :6 Estimated CO2 Savings by Programme 
  
Spending 
Period 
Cost over 
Relevant 
Period £m 
MtCO2 Saved in… 
Cost of CO2 saving (and unit) 
2008-12 2013-17 2018-22 2008-22 
5.1 Carbon Emissions Reduction Target            
 predecessor policies 2002-08   16.9 14.9 8.9 40.7    
 
current policies 2008-11 3210 15.3 23.1 22.0 60.4 53 £/tonne saved between 
2008-22 
           
 all supplier obligations 2002-??   32.2 38.0 30.9 101.1    
5.2 Community Energy Saving Programme 2009-12 300 0.5 0.4 0.4 1.3 231 £/tonne saved between 
2008-22 
5.3 Renewable Obligation (Total) ? ? 52.6 120.5 221.3 394.4    
5.4 Carbon Trust (& SALIX) ? ? 3.9 5.7 5.7 15.3    
5.5 Climate Change Agreements ? ? 20.0 20.5 20.5 61.0    
5.6 Decent Homes + Warm Front + Devolved 
Administration Programmes ? 
? 11.7 12.9 12.9 37.5   
 
5.7 Green Bus Fund ? ?  0.2 0.9 1.1    
5.8 Carbon Capture and Storage Demonstrations ? ?  5.4 20.9 26.3    
Source: All CO2 Savings from DECC (2009) UK Low Carbon Transition Plan 
 
5.9 Feed in Tariffs 2009-20 3100 7 MtCO2 saved to 2020 443 £/tonne saved by 2020 
5.10 Renewables Exemption From CCL ? ? 1 MtCO2 saved per year by 2010   
5.11 Enhanced Capital Allowances for Energy 
Saving Technologies 
2010 150 3.2 lifetime MtCO2 for one years 
induced improvements 
47 £/tonne saved 
5.12 Landlord Energy Saving Allowance       
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Notes on Table 6: 
Forecasts of CO2 savings for 5.1 to 5.7 come from DECC‟s Low Carbon Transition Plan 
(2009a) 
 
5.1 Carbon Emissions Reduction Target (CERT) 
Mandated spending on previous editions of CERT (from 2002-2008) indicate savings 
of 40.7MtCO2 between 2008-22. Carbon savings tail off fairly rapidly towards the 
end of DECC‟s forecast period, possibly reflecting the heavy reliance on the free 
distribution of energy saving light bulbs in previous periods. Mandated spending in 
2008-11 is estimated to save 60.4MtCO2 with savings holding up well in the final 
budget period, indicating that the total savings attributable to these interventions is 
likely to be higher. Estimated spending of £3.2bn by energy companies indicates a 
cost per tonne of CO2 of £53 across the forecast period although the cost over the 
lifetime of the interventions is surely lower. Note that the cost of the savings here 
does not include savings on energy bills by customers in receiving the interventions 
(although many of these will make co-payments) so the overall cost to society is 
lower. The cost of savings made by the successor programme to CERT may be higher 
to the extent that the low hanging fruit is picked first, although this may be somewhat 
offset by improvements in energy saving technology. 
 
5.2 Community Energy Saving Programme (CESP) 
Mandated spending on CESP (2009-12) is forecast to save 1.3MtCO2 from 2008-22, 
at a cost of £231 per tonne. As with CERT, there are surely further CO2 savings after 
2022. The higher cost of savings is not surprising as co-payments under CESP are 
minimal so the cost is the full cost of installing upgrades, and the whole house 
approach of CESP means that energy saving upgrades that might not take place under 
CERT will be implemented. Again, as with CERT but especially applicable to CESP 
due to the lack of co-payments, the costs do not take into account the reductions in 
energy bills enjoyed by beneficiaries of the programmes so the costs to society are 
lower. 
 
5.3 Renewables obligation 
The renewables obligation is forecast to save 394.4MtCO2 from 2008-22. This 
includes savings from future renewables obligation for which the costs are 
unavailable so the cost per tonne is not available 
 
5.5 Climate Change Agreements 
Climate change agreements are forecast to save 61.0MtCO2 from 2008-22. As with 
Carbon Trust and SALIX, it is not clear which period of spending on these 
programmes the savings relate to but presumably future activity under these or 
successor programmes is not included. Note, this represents an increase in the saving 
expected at the time of the introduction of the climate change levy from around 
2.5MtCO2 per year to 4.1MtCO2 per year, highlighting the difficulty in forecasting 
carbon savings (HMRC 2000 Regulatory Impact Assessment – Climate Change 
Levy). 
 
5.6 Decent Homes and Warm Front 
Warm Front and the devolved administration programmes are forecast to save 
37.5MtCO2 from 2008-22. As with Carbon Trust and SALIX, it is not clear which 
period of spending on these programmes the savings relate to but presumably future 
activity under these or successor programmes is not included. 
 
5.7 Green bus fund 
Green buses, interpreted here as the green bus fund programme but possibly including 
upgrades to the bus fleet made without central government support, are forecast to 
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save 1.1MtCO2 from 2008-22. It is not clear precisely what spending these saving 
relate to. 
 
Forecasts of CO2 savings for 5.9 to 5.13 come from the programmes relevant impact 
assessments. Any further adjustments are mentioned below. 
 
5.9 Feed in tariffs 
Feed in tariffs are forecast to save 7MtCO2 by 2020 at a cost to consumers of £3.1bn, 
or £443 per tonne. It is not clear whether there will be further savings after this period 
but the resource cost of the carbon saved to 2030 is forecast to be around twenty 
times the cost of the same quantity of carbon permits. 
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7.  Summary and Conclusions 
Chart 3 brings together our expenditure estimates, and Table 7 calculates these 
in real terms after inflation.
4
 We summarise our findings on fiscal costs and 
then the other issues addressed in this report. 
 
Chart 3: Spending on household climate mitigation and environmental tax 
receipts 
 
 
                                                 
4
  We should note here that our figures are much lower than official totals for all 
environmental expenditure. According to the 2010 Treasury Public Expenditure 
Statistical Analysis (PESA), this totalled £9.6bn in 2008-09, of which £5.7bn (59%) 
was classified as waste management, the major part of which was local waste 
collection and disposal and nuclear decommissioning. Yet the spending tagged 
„Provision for Nuclear Decommissioning‟ in the 2008-09 COINS data implies higher 
expenditure of £5.7bn and an alternative approach, looking at net transfers to the 
Nuclear Decommissioning Authority, yields a yet greater cost to government of 
£8.4bn. The Eurostat figure on total environmental spending in the UK in 2008 is 
higher still at £10.9b. When the expenditure data is gathered on a different basis 
(albeit with the same system of classification) the results can look quite different! 
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Table 7:  Nominal vs. Real Expenditures 
 
           
£m 
2005-
06 
2006-
07 
2007-
08 
2008-
09 
2009-
10 
2010-
11 
2011-
12 
2012-
13 
2013-
14 
2014-
15 
Nominal Taxes 33,000 33,280 36,030 36,380 37,830 39,930 43,055 44,760 46,975 48,990 
Nominal Mandated 
Spending 890 1,010 1,170 2,100 2,270 2,530 2,950 3,150 3,400 3,730 
Nominal Direct 
Spending 915 1,065 1,120 1,110 1,100 1,100 1,125 1,035 985 1,035 
           HMT GDP Deflator 
(June Budget 2010)* 90 93 96 98 100 103 105 107 110 113 
Real Environmental 
Taxes 36,650 35,760 37,640 36,990 37,830 38,800 41,060 41,730 42,680 43,220 
Real Mandated 
Spending 990 1,100 1,230 2,150 2,280 2,470 2,820 2,950 3,100 3,260 
Real Direct 
Expenditure 1,100 1,240 1,270 1,230 1,220 1,180 1,130 1,020 900 870 
*Assumed to increase by 3% in 2014-15 
Nominal GDP (Bns) 1,274 1,348 1,424 1,432 1,403 1,474 1,539 1,620 1,710 1,796 
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Fiscal priorities 
The ambitious carbon targets of the 2008 Climate Change Act are not reflected 
in the UK government programmes and budgets. Direct government spending 
on all CCM policies is very small – c£1.bn this year and will most likely fall or 
remain flat through  to 2014. Over the same period, mandated spending by the 
utility companies will rise from £2.5bn to £3.3bn. Yet the two combined 
amount to a mere 0.24% of GDP now and will rise to 0.27% by 2014. These 
are tiny sums of money given the scale of government ambitions. 
 
Environmental tax revenues are an order of magnitude greater amounting to 
some £40bn at present and by the end of this parliament will be around £49bn. 
But as a share of GDP they are also predicted to fall, from 2.6% to 2.4%. There 
has been no significant switch to green taxation, nor is one planned.  
 
The consumer will pay 
The UK‟s growing reliance on emissions trading and the „mandated markets‟ 
approach, means that the burden of CMPs falls on energy consumers, and 
ultimately on households – and this is intended. Rising fuel prices together with 
some impact from these measures have boosted average fuel bills by 70% from 
£694 in 2003 to £1200 in 2008 (DECC 2010a). DECC estimates that domestic 
gas prices will be 12% higher and electricity prices 40% higher by 2020. Yet it 
also assumes the uptake of energy efficiency measures and renewables 
incentives will be such that average domestic bills will rise by only 1% by 
2020. These assumptions sound complacent; and it is also likely that the better 
off will gain more from energy efficiency measures. 
 
Fuel poverty and the distributional consequences 
The escalation in fuel bills in the early years of this century more than doubled 
the proportion of UK households modelled as being in fuel poverty. The CCC 
estimates that the electricity and gas price impacts of the UK carbon budgets 
could increase the number of fuel poor households by 1.7m by 2022 (CCC 
2008: 395). This illustrates the likely future regressive impact of „mandated 
market policies‟ which are intended to be financed from higher consumer bills. 
 
Compensation trumps eco-social investment 
At present spending on Winter Fuel Payments alone exceeds the total spent on 
all carbon efficiency programmes directed to low income households – and to 
this has now been added the Warm Homes Discount In other words, these 
(extremely inefficient) compensation payments exceed what have been called 
„eco-social investment‟ programmes which are designed to achieve both social 
distribution and carbon reduction goals. If compensation remains a major 
aspect of fuel poverty policy this cost will escalate in the future.  
 
Carbon savings are small and costly 
The „heavy lifting‟ in carbon savings is expected to be done by the ETS and 
domestic obligations on energy suppliers. The implicit CO2 cost in all the 
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programmes we could estimate exceeds the current ETS carbon price of €15 
(c£13) per tonne, or the estimated „level playing field price‟ of €40 per tonne. 
There is also great variation: Feed-In and the Community Energy Saving 
Programme are notably ineffective in terms of savings per pound spent.  
 
Our conclusions are that present central government programmes to reduce 
direct GHG household emissions are small and patchy. They are increasingly 
delivered through mandated energy markets which are indirectly financed 
through average household energy bills. This impacts much more adversely on 
lower income groups. It is also likely that higher income groups will avail 
themselves of energy and carbon saving investments and thus see their bills 
falling or not rising so fast. Those programmes directed to low income 
households are tiny and stagnant and are outweighed by social programmes 
designed to compensate fuel poverty but which do nothing to reduce its 
underlying causes. The ambitious aims of the Climate Change Act are very 
distant when we dissect current programmes for climate change mitigation at 
the household level. Moreover, they pose growing dilemmas over fairness 
which social programmes are ill-designed to meet, and which are in any case 
being cut back. To reconcile carbon abatement and social equity will entail a 
more radical synthesis of environmental and social policies which cannot be 
discussed here (see Gough et al 2011). 
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Recommendations 
The major impact of CCMPs on social policy is likely to be distributional, not 
fiscal: new ways will need to be found to counteract the regressivity of 
increasing electricity and fuel prices which any carbon reduction strategy must 
entail. This is much discussed and we do not have the space to treat this debate 
here (see eg. CCC 2008 ch.12, Nef 2008, King Badouin Foundation 2010, 
Preston and White 2010). The major alternatives are a) improved compensation 
payments for fuel-poor households, b) publicly and separately financed energy 
efficiency improvements for low income and fuel-poor households, and c) 
„social‟ electricity and fuel tariffs.  
 
Numerous studies have demonstrated that compensating low income losing 
households is very difficult to do due to the great heterogeneity of such 
households (variation by housing stock, rural-urban, occupation levels etc) – 
this is discussed further in Gough et al (2011). The emphasis must remain on 
the second: much more robust low carbon housing policies, with special help 
for low income households, for which there is a strong economic as well as 
social case. The Climate Change Committee has on several occasions called for 
a „step change‟ in household carbon-saving policies and for more upfront 
government subsidies, but has so far met little government response. The 
Coalition government is cutting all public spending sharply and is moving 
further in the opposite direction towards mandated private policies such as 
Green Deal.  
 
But even if implemented on a radical scale, this would still leave millions of 
households vulnerable to fuel poverty in the – very long – meantime. The third 
alternative could then be considered in addition: to adjust the current charging 
policies of utility companies by lowering the marginal costs of initial units of 
electricity or gas consumed, and raising the marginal costs of successive units. 
This would recognise the „basic need‟ component of the first block of 
household energy and the progressive choice element in successive units, and 
thus would be intrinsically progressive. It would also tackle fuel poverty 
directly since fuel poor households consume below average amounts of 
electricity and gas (CCC 2008: 409). This would not incentivise higher 
emissions, merely redistribute the costs from lower to higher emitters. Though 
this solution has been raised by the Climate Change Committee it would 
require a radical shift in the pricing policies and regulation of private utility 
companies – a reversal of the liberalisation and deregulation agenda of the past 
three decades.  
 
A combination of a large increase in eco-social investment and the introduction 
of social pricing of energy would entail a radical change of direction that is 
nowhere yet in sight.   
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